MARCH 9
Liberalism and Fundamentalism
I should like, first of all, to define the terms liberalism and fundamentalism. To arrive at universally acceptable definition has never been an easy task, but I think that good, workable definition of liberalism and fundamentalism should be, respectively, reason-based thinking, as opposed to scripture-based thinking.
Once we accept these definitions, we have a set of criteria by which to judge the actions of both liberals and fundamentalists. However, what we find, in the light of these criteria, is that neither group has truly adhered to its professed doctrines. Neither have the liberals been guided by reason, nor have the fundamentalists been by the scriptures.
In the Indian context, the Shah Bano case provides a telling example by which to judge the validity of the respective stands adopted by these two groups. During this case, such emphasis was laid on the fact that, according to the Islamic Shariah, a divorced wife was entitled only to temporary provision by her husband; she did not have the right to ask for permanent maintenance. This point was seized upon and highlighted by the liberals in order to prove that Islamic Law was in need of revision, without which it was not practicable in modern times.
To my way of thinking, in this case, the liberals neither thought nor acted reasonably. Had reason been appealed to, the liberals ought surely to have accepted the reality of the western world having already tried—and found wanting—the system of permanent maintenance for a divorced wife. Western laws, in obliging the ex-husband to pay permanent maintenance to his ex-wife, placed the man at an irreversible disadvantage. It is hardly surprising then that divorce having proved so costly time and again, attitudes to marriage began to change. As a result, more than fifty per cent of the young couples living together today are unwed, so that when they separate, the man does not have to pay for the maintenance of his former partner. Seen in the light of reason, the option, in reality, is not between permanent or temporary maintenance, but between any kind of provision and complete sexual anarchy. This being the reality, is it proper for liberals to ignore the experience of the west and blindly ridicule Islamic Law? The adoption of such a stance runs counter both to reason and to religion.
The position adopted by the fundamentalists in the Shah Bano case was flared in much the same manner as that of the liberals, in that it did not derive from or conform to the principles propounded by them. When the verdict in favour of maintenance was given, Muslim fundamentalists raised a great hue and cry against the Supreme Court’s decision, completely ignoring the fact that to do so was quite against the teachings of the Quran.
Consider the almost parallel case, which took place in Madinah during the lifetime of the Prophet. A Muslim, called Basheer, who once had a dispute with a Jew, could have referred his case to the Prophet and been given a verdict based on the Shari’ah. But he chose, instead, to take his problems to a Jew by the name of Kaab Bin Ashraf, who used to settle any disputes referred to him. The Quran comments on this incident, but has nothing to say against Kaab Bin Ashraf. On the contrary, the Quran only condemned the Muslim for taking his case to this Jew instead of the Prophet. That is to say that the scriptures condemned the verdict-seeker rather than the verdict-giver.
Notwithstanding this Quranic example, the Muslim fundamentalists of India, without exception, kept silent on the subject of the verdict-seeker. Their entire animus was directed against the Supreme Court, in so doing, the Muslim fundamentalists were following, not their Scriptures, but personal whims.
According to the Quran (46:4), there are two sources of knowledge, one established, the other revealed. It would be correct to say that, in principle, the liberal group bases its judgement in established knowledge, while the fundamentalist group stands by revealed knowledge. But if the fundamentalists had genuinely adhered to the Scriptures, they would have diverted their campaign against the verdict-seeker rather than against the verdict-giver (i.e., the Court). Similarly, if the liberals had been true to their own professed doctrines, they would, as a matter of principle, have admitted the veracity of Islamic Law in this particular instance, rather than get about discrediting Islam.
