DOUBLE MISTAKE
In the modern age, the old monarchical model had become disastrously ineffective. Still, two hundred years of failed attempts haven’t managed to change the ignorance of incapable Muslim leaders. Even though the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were completely lost, they still seem to view that old monarchical model as the standard approach in the twenty-first century. Today, this failed monarchical model is repeated in two ways: first, when rulers try to adopt it, and second, when non-governmental individuals or groups attempt to follow it.
Sultan Tipu is an example of the first type—he tried to restore monarchical power but failed. He couldn’t see beyond the old royal system. In 1799, he died fighting a reckless war against the British. Similarly, Saddam Hussein, the former president of Iraq, is a modern example of someone who failed by following this same monarchical model. Following this, the second type of experiment within this model emerged—when non-governmental groups began fighting against perceived enemies. The earliest example of this likely occurred in 1831, when Maulana Syed Ahmad Barelvi and his companions’ caravan was destroyed in a battle against Maharaja Ranjit in Balakot. Later, in 1857, another major event of this kind happened when a group of Indian Muslim scholars launched an armed jihad against the British. Since then, non-governmental organizations have continued a long series of failed attempts using the monarchical model, which persists to this day.
In places like Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya, the Philippines, Arakan, and many others, violent armed conflicts are occurring in the name of jihad. These illustrate the second type of experience with the Sultanate model. This second type, which began through non-governmental organizations using guerrilla warfare, proxy wars, and similar tactics, proved to be even more deadly than the first. It involved two errors at the same time: first, the anachronistic attempt to apply the old conflict-based model in an age of peaceful dialogue and negotiation; and second, and more serious, mistake was that this approach was entirely wrong under Islamic law (Shariah). This is because it is well-known that only an established government has the right to conduct armed warfare. Non-governmental groups are not permitted to declare someone an enemy and start armed conflict against them.
If the Sultanate model in the first case was simply ignorance, then in the second, it represented ignorance combined with a clear violation of Shariah. This double mistake explains why recent armed jihad led by Muslim leaders has completely failed. The cause is not a foreign conspiracy, as many scholars and intellectuals often claim without evidence. The Sultanate model is fundamentally different from peaceful ideological dialogue. The peaceful dialogue model creates an environment fully aligned with Islam. In contrast, the Sultanate model fosters an environment that is completely opposed to Islamic principles.
An example of this is the Kashmir issue with Pakistan. The idea of Pakistan was entirely shaped by Sultanate thinking. If Pakistani leaders had adopted the peaceful interfaith dialogue approach, they would never have discussed dividing the land. Their thinking was influenced by the old Sultanate model, which focuses solely on political power, with no regard for interfaith engagement. As a result, they initiated the movement for partition, which fueled hatred across the Indian subcontinent. And all avenues for ideological dialogue came to a standstill.
This un-Islamic and unwise politics entered its second phase in 1947. When the region gained independence from British rule on August 15, 1947, there were two major state problems: Hyderabad and Kashmir. In Hyderabad, Hindus were the majority, but the ruler was Muslim. In Kashmir, Muslims were the majority, but the ruler was Hindu. The question was what the political future of these two states would be. The Nawab of Hyderabad formally decided to join Pakistan, while the Raja of Kashmir signed papers to join India. To end this dispute, the leadership in New Delhi made a practical offer. They told the Pakistani leaders: You withdraw your claim on Hyderabad, and we will withdraw our claim on Kashmir. This would end the dispute, and both countries could begin developing on a moderate path.
Supporting this offer, the Quran clearly instructs: “Then if they should be inclined to make peace, make peace with them” (8:61). This means that if the other side offers peace, you should accept it immediately. However, Pakistani leaders, who were deeply influenced by the traditional Sultanate model and guided by a governing mindset, felt unable to accede to this significant offer. The great destruction that followed is well-known to everyone. The Pakistani leaders’ inexplicable ignorance regarding Kashmir is confirmed by historical records. This issue can be studied in detail in the following books.
1. Looking Back by Marchand Mahajan.
2. Witness to an Era by Frank Morris.
3. Emergence of Pakistan by Chaudhry Muhammad Ali.
4. The Nation that Lost its Soul by Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan.
The traditional state-centred outlook of Pakistan’s leaders made it difficult for them to resolve the Kashmir issue through negotiations. They then made an even more serious mistake by imagining that the issue could be settled through military means. First, they directly engaged India in armed conflict, but this attempt ended in complete failure. Still, their authoritarian mindset prevented them from adopting a more realistic approach. So, they launched a covert war against India in Kashmir—commonly called a “proxy war.” This proxy war not only caused destruction for both Pakistan and Kashmir but also clearly went against Islamic teachings. In Islam, it is necessary to formally declare war before engaging in it: “Throw their treaty back at them, so as to be on equal terms”. (8:58).
To justify this un-Islamic and unwise war against India, Pakistan made several serious mistakes. For example, it turned its foreign policy and media completely into tools for defaming India and spreading hatred against it. Even though Pakistan was fully involved in the guerrilla war—or proxy war—in Kashmir, it kept claiming it had no direct role in the conflict. Yet the whole world knows that the militancy in Kashmir is entirely supported by Pakistan.
At the same time, to appear as a peaceful nation, Pakistani leaders repeatedly signed peace agreements: the Tashkent Agreement (1965), the Simla Agreement (1976), and the Lahore Declaration (1998).
Despite all such agreements and declarations, Pakistan’s leaders continued to act in ways that were contrary to Islamic principles. On paper, they repeatedly said that the Kashmir issue should be resolved through peaceful talks, not war. However, these agreements seemed more for show because Pakistan never actually stopped its secret military operations after signing them. According to the Quran, it is essential for Muslims to honour both the words and the spirit of any agreement: “Keep your promises; you will be called to account for every promise which you have made” (Quran 17 34). If Pakistani leaders were to move beyond their authoritarian model and think within a framework of peaceful outreach, they would realize that the Quran offers clear guidance. The Quran explains that every individual and every nation will face hardship in this world. What should people do in such situations? The answer is found in this verse of the Quran: “so that you may not grieve for what has escaped you, nor be exultant over what you have gained” (57 23).
This verse from the Quran offers guidance for Pakistani leaders: they should willingly accept the loss of Kashmir, just as they were forced to accept the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. They need to end their current despair-driven policy on Kashmir. In other words, they should recognize the current reality (status quo) regarding Kashmir and foster moderate relations with India. Instead of pursuing a negative political course, they should adopt a positive approach. Doing so will finally open the door to progress —a door that has remained closed for more than half a century.
