Effect on the Audience
Those influenced by this interpretation begin to perceive Islam primarily as a political and social system. Consequently, they start viewing their audience in much the same way that general political and social movements view theirs. Their focus shifts from guiding people toward spiritual rectitude to “shaping public opinion” to secure as many votes as possible for gaining power in the current democratic age. The distinctions between Muslim and non-Muslim change in their perspective. Here, I would like to quote a line from Policy (published in 1959):
“Since the Quranic invitation is a universal one, addressing every individual regardless of race or community, and since both Muslim and non-Muslim communities exist in our country, our movement will consider both types of people as its audience. From the perspective of the movement’s interests, each of these groups holds a distinct importance that is not shared by the other.”
The significance of the Muslim group, according to this interpretation, lies in the assumption that members for the movement can likely be found within it, as has been proven through experience. Therefore, in practice, this group becomes the primary field of action. The non-Muslim group is considered significant because, at present, they not only constitute a vast majority in the country but also hold a superior position in intellectual, social, and economic terms and possess political authority. Hence, any movement aiming for success cannot overlook this majority group in the country.”
Reflect on this excerpt. Its first evident flaw is that it places Muslims and non-Muslims on the same level. The unique status of the Muslim Ummah (community) no longer holds any significance in this mindset. It views Muslims in the same way it views other people around the world. If the Muslim group holds any particular importance, it is not due to any religious or Shariah (Islamic) law considerations but simply because, from the movement’s perspective, it holds a specific practical importance. This importance is solely that, by assumption, the movement is likely to find its members within this group—and indeed has done so through experience. In other words, if this ideology has any special interest in Muslims, it is purely pragmatic, similar to how a country’s Ministry of Defense views its “recruitment area.”
The existence of the Muslim Ummah does not instill any sense of responsibility in their minds. Instead, they perceive it as a kind of “raw material” from which they can extract individuals to become “members” of their movement. Such people naturally do not consider it appropriate to design any reform program specifically aimed at Muslims, as they view this as contrary to Islam’s global revolutionary character. In their view, this would cast doubt on Islam’s “universal ideology” in the eyes of the people. This mindset can reach such an extent that even in the most severe conditions, if some among them—those with softer hearts—feel compassion for the deteriorating state of the Muslim Ummah and wish to add “community issues” to the organization’s policy, others in the group will immediately perceive a hint of nationalism in this approach. They will strongly object, arguing that it is against Islam’s foundational principles to develop a program focused on a specific group.
A similar situation applies in relation to people of other faith. The Quranic conception describes believers as witnesses to the truth among them, bearing testimony to ultimate accountability in the Hereafter. The function of this testimony is to serve as a reminder of human responsibility and the transience of worldly power. Yet, when the pursuit of political dominance began to be viewed as the primary goal of Islam, this deeper moral and Hereafter concern were pushed into the background. Instead, thoughts of them arose from the perspective that “a movement cannot succeed without engaging with the majority group in the country.” As a result, the true nature of non-Muslims faded in the minds of those influenced by this interpretation. They were not concerned with rescuing them from the accountability of the Hereafter; rather, they began viewing them as a group whose “opinions” needed to be “shaped” in favor of the movement to secure their votes.
An illustrative example of this mentality can be seen in the following clause from Article 5 of the Constitution of the Jamaat:
“The organization will pursue its objectives through constructive and peaceful means. It will achieve this by reforming minds and character through preaching, persuasion, and the dissemination of ideas, thus preparing public opinion to bring about the desired righteous revolution in the country’s social life.”
Observe how, in this interpretation, non-Muslims, who are fundamentally the subject of our reminder regarding the Day of Meeting (Yawm al-Talaq), have been reduced to a matter of shaping public opinion. It’s as if, as long as they align with us at the ballot box, there’s no further need to think about them. For, according to this view, this alone suffices to bring about a righteous transformation in “collective life.”
