Argument from Islamic Jurisprudence
One argument presented by the ideologues of this interpretation is as follows:
Jihad, cutting off the hand (for theft), the punishment for false accusation (qadhf), the punishment for adultery (zina), the punishment for alcohol (khamr), and making decisions in accordance with the guidance revealed by Allah regarding transactions are all definitive commandments in the Quran that cannot be denied. However, these laws are currently not being enforced. Every Muslim reads them in the Quran. Discussions about them occur in religious schools, and speakers and writers elaborate on their details. Yet, when it comes to practical application, it is often said that an Islamic government is necessary for their enforcement, and since there is no Islamic government today, we cannot implement these laws.
We argue that if these laws are contingent upon the existence of an Islamic government, then acquiring the conditions necessary for that government is obligatory, as it is a well-established principle of Islamic law that the fulfillment of obligations and duties depends on the conditions required to achieve them. For example, along with the obligation of performing ablution (wudu), making an effort to obtain water is also obligatory to the extent of one’s ability.
Ala tara anna tahseel asbaab al-wajib wajibun wa tahseel asbaab al-haram haramun. (Musallam al-Subut, Vol. 1, p. 94) That is, do you not see that acquiring the means to fulfill an obligation is itself obligatory, and acquiring the means to commit a forbidden act is itself forbidden, by consensus. (Monthly Zindagi, December 1962)
In my opinion, there is a fallacy underlying this argument. The principle concerning the acquisition of the means to fulfill an obligation is presented as if it were an absolute rule that applies to everything labeled as “obligatory” or “mandatory” in the Quran and Hadith. This suggests that for every action mandated by Islamic law, believers must endeavor to provide the means for its fulfillment, and if they do not currently have them, they should work to obtain those means. However, this is not accurate.
The situation is not such that for every action regarded as obligatory by Shariah, the acquisition of its means is also necessarily obligatory. Instead, there are specific conditions. Here, we quote the editor of the “Zindagi” who wrote the following note beneath the aforementioned lines:
“In the case of obligatory acts, the scholars of Usul al-Fiqh have placed two conditions on the necessity of acquiring their means and prerequisites. The first is that the obligation must be absolute and not conditioned by any specific reason or prerequisite from the lawgiver. The second is that the means and conditions must be within the capability of the responsible person (mukallaf). If either of these two conditions is absent, then acquiring the means and prerequisites will not be obligatory.
A legal example of the first condition is the issue of Zakat. The reason for the obligation of Zakat on gold and silver is the possession of a complete Nisab (minimum threshold), and the condition is that a year must pass (Hawl). However, it is not obligatory for any Muslim to strive to attain the Nisab, nor is it obligatory for someone who has Nisab to ensure that it is preserved for a full year to fulfill the obligation of Zakat. This is because the ruling regarding Zakat is not absolute but rather a conditioned ruling from Shariah. The requirement of Shariah is that if a Muslim possesses the Nisab and it remains with him for a year, then the obligation to fulfill the ruling applies only when the means and conditions are present.”
An example of the second condition is the prayer times, which serve as means for prayer but are not obligatory for anyone to acquire, as they are beyond a person’s control.
The meaning of this excerpt is not that the editor of “Zindagi” disagrees with the aforementioned writer or that he agrees with my opinion in this discussion. He accepts the classification of the aforementioned rulings, but he believes that the obligation of “cutting off the hand of a thief” and “punishing the adulterer” given to Muslims is a “general obligation.” Its existence or validity depends on the existence of a government. Therefore, the acquisition of this condition is indeed obligatory. He further writes:
“The Muslim Ulama are agreed that appointing an Imam, or establishing an Islamic government, is a necessary condition for carrying out these injunctions. That is to say, the obligation of these injunctions does not mean that if a caliph exists and a government is established, then you should act upon them. Rather, it means that these injunctions, which are obligatory upon you, cannot be fulfilled without the appointment of a caliph and the establishment of government; therefore, acquiring this condition becomes obligatory upon you in order to act upon these injunctions.” (Monthly Zindagi, December 1962 / Rajab 1382 AH)
The “consensus” of the Muslim Ulama to which the writer refers here is itself correct—that the enforcement of collective injunctions requires the existence of an Islamic government. But the question of who the addressees of these collective injunctions are is a separate issue, which is not established by this “consensus.” His error lies in considering the general body of believers as the addressees of these injunctions, misapplying the “you” to whom the command is directed. In reality, the addressees of collective and societal injunctions are the community of believers as an organized body possessing authority, not individual and scattered believers. This is a conditional command, not an absolute one. (For details, see the chapter “Correct Understanding Of Religion” in the book.)
The second point is that recognizing the qualification or condition of these rulings does not mean that “when a government is established, then implement them.” Instead, this qualification means that the demand for implementing these rulings is not placed on ordinary Muslims, but on those believers who are empowered and capable. Whenever such believers are present, the command will immediately apply to them, and they will need to acquire the “cause” that is a prerequisite for fulfilling these rulings. In other words, it is obligatory for the empowered Muslim community to enforce these rulings, and because it is obligatory for them to do so, they must establish an Islamic government among themselves to enforce these rulings.
However, this does not end the discussion, as there is another mistake hidden in this argument. Regarding the interpretation at hand, it is fundamentally incorrect to cite the issue of the appointment of an Imamate as evidence supporting it. This is because this interpretation explains the entire mission of dawah. It defines our responsibility regarding all the commandments. In contrast, the issue of appointing an Imam only concerns the political organization of a society; it addresses the requirements of Islam regarding a specific matter. Citing it as an argument for the interpretation at hand is like trying to understand the whole human experience based on issues related to economic demands. Clearly, economic rulings relate to a specific aspect of life and cannot serve as a basis for studying the entire human being.
Furthermore, this interpretation presents a vision of the Islamic mission that aims to establish Islamic governance throughout the world. This means that this interpretation articulates the work we are tasked with by Allah, which must be carried out universally for both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. No matter where we are or in what condition we find ourselves, this is the mission entrusted to us by Allah, and it is for this that we must remain active. This is the call found in the literature of the interpretation under discussion that is spread across all books. However, the issue of the appointment of an Imamate has no connection to such a mission. The obligation of appointing an Imam is determined specifically in relation to the Muslims’ own sphere of action, not the entire world.
It is another matter that when this Imamate is established, non-Muslims living in its territory also come under its jurisdiction, and many of its rulings apply to them as well. However, when the theologians say, “al-muslimoon la budda lahum min imaam” (Al-Aqaid al-Nasafiyyah with the commentary of Taftazani, p. 467), meaning that it is essential for Muslims to have an Imam; or when they say, “nasb al-imaam ‘indana wajibun” (Al-Mawaqif fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam by Al-Iji, p. 395), meaning that appointing a leader over themselves is obligatory for Muslims—this statement refers to a duty that concerns the Muslim community itself. That is, it does not mean that “Muslims are obliged to establish an Islamic government over all believers and non-believers throughout the world.” Rather, it means that “Muslims are obliged to appoint among themselves a political leader for implementing Islamic laws and safeguarding the objectives of the Shariah,” according to our view.
As I have stated, my main objection concerns how the mission has been interpreted in the literature under discussion. Therefore, mentioning the appointment of an Imam does not override my objection. Using the appointment of an Imam to justify the interpretation is like deriving the command that “appoint an Imam over the entire world” based on the rules for appointing an Imam for congregational prayers.
It should be clear that I have no opposition to the appointment of an Imam or an Islamic government. My objection is actually to the interpretation that claims the true demand of the religion and the mission of the believers is to strive for the establishment of an Islamic government in this world. A certain practical approach may be correct at times, but if this is given a general and theoretical status, then this theory will be inherently flawed.
One writer states:
If viewed purely from a juridical and legal perspective, it will also be established that the responsibility of the Muslims here is to strive for an Islamic revolution in this country in accordance with the objectives presented by the group. Before British rule, India was a Dar al-Islam, but afterward, the infidels took control of this Dar al-Islam and transformed it into a Dar al-Kufr. Regarding such a situation, the verdict of the jurists is that it is obligatory for Muslims to end this infidel occupation and restore the country to being a Dar al-Islam.
This argument contains two mistakes. First, it tries to generalize a specific and temporary ruling, which clearly applies only to reclaiming a usurped Dar al-Islam. This matter relates to a specific legal situation, while we are discussing a broad and universal issue. The legal point simply shows what Muslims should do if that particular situation occurs. However, the issue we are examining is what Muslims should do in every situation. The individual could have easily understood this point if they had considered that their argument, if valid, only justifies a political goal for Muslims in India. But this argument does not justify adopting such a political goal in many other countries that, from a legal perspective, have never been considered a “Dar al-Islam.” Yet, your claim is that what you call the mission of Islam should be the singular mission of all Muslims worldwide.
The second mistake is that a political ruling has been used to argue about a theoretical issue. A political requirement only expresses the demands of Islamic law regarding politics, just as a ruling concerning worship reveals the requirements of Sharia related to worship. However, the issue at hand pertains to the justification of the entire Sharia. How can an opinion be formed about the entire framework from a specific ruling? Is the entire Sharia merely the name of this particular part? While presenting this argument, the individual seems to have forgotten that they are citing a purely political ruling to support their objective, despite their own claim that this objective relates to all the demands of the religion, not just its political aspect.
Finally, another type of argument emerges. These are people who, after realizing their weakness in reasoning, try to justify their position with a strange kind of logic: that their claim requires no proof at all. They say: “You have unnecessarily dragged us into the ‘circle of argument.’ Otherwise, this matter is so self-evident that one can understand it through reason alone. What need is there for a proof from the religious sources for it? It is merely the result of historical circumstances that Muslims now find it hard to believe that it is also obligatory upon us to change existing conditions.” For this reason, they add: “We now look for such clear verses of the Quran in which we are directly commanded that—the revolution of leadership is obligatory upon Muslims—and since no such explicit command appears before us, we regard all such aspirations as mistaken and all such efforts for a righteous revolution as un-Islamic.” (Al-Hasanat, March, 2nd Issue, 1962)
This argument stems from the writing of Maulana Sadruddin Sahib, which he prepared in response to my reply. I initially addressed this point of his in my letter to Abul Laith Sahib, dated August 19, 1962, included in the second chapter of this book. It has now been taken from there and moved to this chapter. While “appointing an Imam (head of the community)” within their own sphere of authority is indeed obligatory for Muslims, I do not understand on what basis the mission of establishing a global revolution in leadership can be inferred from this.
I would say that the fact that there is no “clear command” in the Quran supporting your interpretation of Islam is evidence in itself that this is not the correct interpretation of the Islamic movement. If it were the correct interpretation, it should certainly have been mentioned in God’s book. Despite this reality, if you insist on your specific interpretation based on a rational analogy, it further proves its shortcomings. When there is no explicit confirmation in the Quran for an interpretation and its supporters present rational arguments instead of Quranic verses, such arguments do not prove its validity but rather indicate its error. The purpose of the Islamic movement and the mission of the Muslim Ummah should be derived from clear verses of the Quran, not from rational speculations.
In conclusion, are the arguments on which the proponents of this interpretation believe that their interpretation has been established through the explicit texts of the Quran and Hadith. If only people realized that what they call “certainty” is often nothing more than an illusion.
