The Ulama in the Age
of Colonialism
The Ulama have not been assigned to become involved in practical politics. Leaving political disputes to politicians, they must devote themselves entirely to what they have been charged with—scholarly work, social reform, constructive efforts and dawah.
With Shah Abdul Aziz of Delhi (1762-1823), a new phase in the activities of the Indian Ulama began. This was a period when Indian Muslim leaders were faced with the challenge posed to the Mughal political authority by internal forces, particularly the Marathas, Jats and Sikhs, with whom some of them directly or indirectly engaged in armed confrontation. They seem to have had little or no awareness that the real challenge they faced was from external forces—that of European colonial powers, armed with new weaponry and technology, who were rapidly conquering large parts of India, as well as much of the Muslim world.
A sign of how powerful these western forces coming to India via sea route had become by this time was that in 1803, the nominal Mughal Emperor of India came under the protection of the East India Company. Only then did the Indian Ulama realise what was happening around them. Thus, in 1806, Shah Abdul Aziz issued a fatwa opining that India had turned into an ‘Abode of war’ or Dar al-harb, noting, as he put it, that he had witnessed that the British, ‘masters of wealth’, had been creating mischief across vast parts of the country, from Delhi to Kabul.
The Indian Ulama began a long political confrontation with the British. In Muslim-dominated parts of Africa, which now fell under French colonial rule, Ulama and other Muslim leaders similarly revolted against the French. However, from the very first day onwards, it was destined that these confrontations would fail because the Ulama viewed the issue of European colonialism simply as caused by people who were wedded to strife, that is, to make mischief in the land. The fact, however, was that European colonialism had succeeded because the Europeans were in command of new intellectual and technological power and resources, which gave them an enormous advantage over Eastern people.
This was something that the Ulama paid little or no attention to. To cite just one example, the British East India Company began laying a railway line in India in 1853, but the Ulama, who rose in jihad in 1857 against the British seemed to have not known about this significant development.
The confrontation that the Ulama of this time called for against the European colonialists was unwarranted from both practical and ideological points of view. From the former perspective, the confrontation supported by the Ulama resulted in nothing, but a one-sided slaughter of Muslims: in no way did it achieve the desired result that they thought it would. The Ulama possessed only traditional weaponry, while the western colonial powers were armed with technologically advanced weapons. It was not simply a question of a quantitative difference in power as far as two opposing parties were concerned, as used to be the case in the past. The difference was qualitative, and the hiatus between the two camps was enormous. Given this fact, this confrontation was in accordance neither with Islam nor with reason.
As a matter of principle, the Ulama have not been assigned to become involved in practical politics. If they assume this role, their other, much more essential responsibilities are bound to be neglected. The Ulama must always observe the division of the areas of activity that we have discussed earlier. In other words, they must leave political disputes to politicians to handle and, instead, devote themselves entirely to scholarly work, social reform, constructive efforts and dawah. They are charged with the responsibility for these activities. They must, therefore, focus on the responsibility they are charged with.
The period extending from towards the end of the Khilafat-e-Rashida, the age of the ‘Rightly-Guided Caliphs’, through the Umayyad Caliphate and down to the end of the Abbasid Caliphate covers a span of some six centuries. This period witnessed numerous internal political confrontations. However, it was also formalised by various disciplines that came under the ‘Islamic sciences’. How was this constructive work made possible amid enormous political strife? The sole reason is that the Ulama and the rest of the scholarly community kept aloof from political strife and focused on intellectual pursuits like compilation and classification of various sciences. This division of roles enabled these scholars to focus their energies on the enormously valuable task of crystallizing these various branches of Islamic knowledge while remaining unaffected by the political tumult around them.
Similarly, the Muslim empire of Spain (Andalusia), which spanned about eight hundred years, too was marred by political clashes and uprisings throughout this period. Despite all this, the educational and scientific services rendered by the Ulama and the Muslim scholars during the same period are astonishingly remarkable. The reason was again the same; the Ulama and the Muslim scholars kept themselves aloof from the political strife, focusing, instead, on their intellectual and other related tasks.
Sadly, in the age of European colonialism, most of the Ulama abandoned their primary task—of the intellectual development of people along constructive lines. Instead, they became involved in useless political conflicts, which they termed ‘jihad’. However, in the same period, some Ulama realised that they could not waste their energies in such conflicts. Instead, they believed they must remain aloof from politics and focus on intellectual development and training along constrictive lines. However, these Ulama were in such a small minority that they proved ineffective in bringing any significant change in the state of affairs.
In 1857, many Indian Ulama declared what they regarded as ‘jihad through the sword’ against the British. There was a noted alim in Deoband, Maulana Shaikh Muhammad, whose opinion opposed that of the Ulama who favoured jihad. He claimed that, far from it being a duty binding on Muslims to wage armed jihad against the British, given the prevailing conditions, it was not even lawful according to the Islamic Shariah. Hence, a consultative meeting was held in Deoband, in which, among others, Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi and Maulana Muhammad Qasim Nanotvi (both of whom were soon to be closely involved in the establishment of the Darul Uloom at Deoband) also participated. Describing this discussion, Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani writes in his autobiography titled, Naqsh-e-Hayat:
In this meeting, the issue of jihad was discussed. Very courteously, Hazrat Nanotvi asked Maulana Shaikh Muhammad, “Hazrat, what is the reason that you do not declare jihad to be a binding duty (farz), nor even permissible (ja’iz)?” He replied, “We do not have the weapons and instruments for jihad. We are lacking in resources.” Maulana Nanotvi then said, “Do [we] not have even that many resources as [the Muslims had] during the battle of Badr?” At this, Maulana Shaikh Muhammad remained silent. (Naqsh-e-Hayat, 1954, Vol. 2, p. 42)
This comparison made by Maulana Nanotvi with the Battle of Badr (in 624 CE, in which the Makkan opponents of Islam fought the Muslims, led by the Prophet) was undoubtedly incorrect. In that battle, the difference between the two contending parties was quantitative. The Muslim force numbered three hundred thirteen, while their opponents were around one thousand. In contrast, the difference between the two forces in the confrontation of 1857 was qualitative. The Muslims had old-fashioned weapons used in face-to-face fighting, while the British had new weapons, modern scientific inventions that could shoot from afar. The former relied only on limited ground troops, while the latter had a powerful navy, too. The British forces were backed by a community that was fired by a new zeal and determination, while the Muslim army was backed by members of a community that had degenerated.
However, the Ulama who were leading the revolt at this time did not have any understanding of the fundamental qualitative difference between the two contending forces. Had they fully understood this difference, they would have advocated patience (sabr), not physical jihad for the Muslims. They would have realised that by remaining firm on the path of patience and steadfastness, the Muslims could begin to make the necessary plans for an appropriate response to the prevailing conditions instead of plunging into armed conflict at an inappropriate time and thereby bringing about further destruction.
This is a chilling reminder of how unaware the Ulama at this time were of the conditions that prevailed around them. Although Europe had entered the age of modern communications by this time, the Ulama seemed to be unaware of this significant development. Modern means of communications played a vital role in the British victory in the revolt of 1857, but there is no mention of these in the literature produced by the Indian Ulama of that period.
In his book, The Ifs of History, the British writer F. J. C. Hearnshaw has given many examples that had so and so events or discoveries not taken place, history would have been different. The 19th chapter of this book is titled, ‘If There Had Been No Electric Telegraph in the Fifties.’ An extract from this
chapter is:
“There were in India at the time only 45000 British troops as against more than 250,000 sepoys. Nothing could have saved the lives of any of the British residents, whether military or civilian, in the whole of the Ganges valley, nothing could have prevented the extinction—at any rate temporarily, of the British dominion in Bengal and Oudh, if the mutiny had occurred before the installation of the telegraph. By means of wire (which the mutineers were not able to cut), the Governor-General, Lord Canning, sent for reinforcement from England. Again by telegrams, Lord Canning was able to get, and get quickly, invaluable contingents from Madras, from Bombay, London, and Burma. Further, he was in a position to recall a powerful force under General Outram sent on service into Persia. But most decisive of all was his ability to intercept, by an urgent and peremptory message sent by wire to Singapore, a completely equipped expeditionary army of 5000 men which was just on its way under Lord Elgin to deal with trouble in China. From Cape Colony, too, were brought, in response to a cabled appeal, two batteries of artillery, stores, horses and £ 60,000 in gold.” (pp. 156-157)
