The Views of Bertrand Russell

It was in 1966 that I decided to study the works of Bertrand Russell (1872-1970). Fortunately, I found a whole set of his books in a nearby library. But when I arrived home with this pile of books my wife was shocked. “Now you will surely go astray!” she exclaimed. It has to be accepted that Russell is the most extreme of all the atheists of the modern age, and his writing is so persuasive that one does run the risk of turning atheist after having read him. But by the grace of God, I entered into Russell’s world, then re-emerged with my faith not only intact, but greatly fortified.

Of all the modern philosophers, Russell has carried out the most broad-ranging of studies. The only possible parallel to his work is that of Whitehead, a contemporary and fellow intellectual. Russell himself said of his life’s work, which extended over almost an entire century: “There is only one constant preoccupation: I have throughout been anxious to discover how much one can be said to know and with what degree of certainty or doubtfulness.”

For this purpose, Russell made a special study of four branches of science—physics, physiology, psychology and mathematical logic.

On the basis of these studies, he sets aside the sceptical viewpoint: “Scepticism is psychologically impossible.”

Here man faces a two-sided difficulty. On the one hand, if we concede that the ultimate truth is beyond us, by what compass are our lives to be guided? On the other hand, when we strenuously try to penetrate life’s mysteries, success seems awesomely remote.

“Philosophy from ancient times has made long claims, but what it has achieved is far less as compared to other sciences.”

In spite of life-long effort, even Russell himself could not put forward a coherent philosophy. In the words of Professor Alan Wood: ‘Bertrand Russell is a philosopher without a philosophy.’

Logic and mathematics have together been considered a means of apprehending reality, but according to Russell: ‘Logic and mathematics ... are the alphabet of the book of nature, not the book itself.’

Russell holds that knowledge is of two kinds: ‘knowledge of things and knowledge of truths.’

Expressed differently, knowledge of things is the knowledge of sensible facts. But sensible facts alone are not all that there is to the matter. There are truths which are inherent in the nature of things but which cannot, in themselves, be perceived. The way to arrive at these truths is by inference based on sensible facts. To Russell, inference can be valid, but it must be scientific inference.

Of things, which we learn by direct observation, with no recourse to inference, he says: “I have come to accept the facts of sense and the broad truths of science as things which the philosophers should take as data.” This data consists of our observed sensations: visual, auditory, tactile, etc. But he then goes on to say that our scientific ideas, or concepts about the universe are not knowable through our observed sensations. Rather, our knowledge of the world is the result of inference. He even adds: ‘People’s thoughts are in their heads.’

After an extensive study, he came to the conclusion that much too much emphasis had been laid upon experience, and that, therefore, empiricism as a philosophy must be regarded as having important limitations (p. 191). He goes on to say: “I found that almost all philosophers had been mistaken as to what can and what cannot be inferred from experience alone.” (p. 194)

Later he adds:

Unfortunately, theoretical physics no longer speaks with that splendid dogmatic clarity that it enjoyed in the seventeenth century. Newton worked with four fundamental concepts: space, time, matter and force. All four have been swept into limbo by modern physicists. Space and time, for Newton, were solid, independent things. They have been replaced by space-time, which is not substantial but only a system of relations. Matter has had to be replaced by series of events. Force, which was the first of the Newtonian concepts to be abandoned, has been replaced by energy; and energy turns out to be indistinguishable from the pale ghost, which is all that remains of matter. Cause, which was the philosophical form of what physicists called force, has also become decrepit. 1 will not admit that it is dead, but it has nothing like the vigour of its earlier days.

After life-long study and research he arrived at the conclusion that ‘non-demonstrable inference is also valid’ (p. 204). Without this the whole system of science and day-to-day human life would be paralyzed. According to Russell, science covers both the real world and the world as it is believed to be. The more science advances, the greater the role of what is held to be credible. Because, in science there are some things known as observed facts, and everything beyond them is the scientific abstraction, which is inferred on the basis of observation. ‘The Philosopher is thus compelled to investigate the relation between observed facts and scientific abstractions. Universal skepticism cannot be refuted, but also cannot be accepted.’

As for what has been accomplished by philosophical speculation, he says that his reason for accepting ‘the broad truth of science as things which the philosopher should take as data’ is that even though ‘their truth is not quite certain, it has a higher degree of probability than anything likely to be achieved in philosophical speculation.’

Another passage from the same book completes the picture of Russell’s views, which we have attempted to present here:

It is not always realized how exceedingly abstract is the information that theoretical physics has to give. It lays down certain fundamental equations that enable it to deal with the logical structure of events, while leaving it completely unknown what is the intrinsic character of the events that have the structure. We only know the intrinsic character of events when they happen to us. Nothing whatever in theoretical physics enables us to say anything about the intrinsic character of events elsewhere. They may be just like the events that happen to us or they may be totally different in strictly unimaginable ways. All that physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes. But as to what it is that changes, and what it changes from and to—as to this, physics is silent.

Russell concludes the chapter, “Non-Demonstrable Inference” with the caution that “— there is no such claim to certainty as has, too often and too uselessly, been made by rash philosophers.” (p. 207)

When the accepted philosophical and scientific position is such that we can only observe external appearances without it being possible for us to learn the intrinsic character of things directly, there are only two ways open to us: either to take refuge in scepticism or to admit the truth of religion. Since research has shown that direct knowledge is impossible, it would appear that one must resign oneself to saying: “I do not know anything.” But Russell does not accept this position. He asserts that the inference which is based on external appearance regarding the intrinsic character of things is also valid. In so saying, he arrives close to the very frontiers of religion, which also holds that man, owing to his limited sense perceptions, cannot perceive reality in its full and final form. It is only from his observation of the visible things in the universe that he can infer the reality behind it. It is strange that a man as intelligent as Russell should reject scepticism just as he rejects religion. He forgets that by adopting such a position, he is guilty of contradicting his own standards.

Russell clearly asserts that even such beliefs are valid as have not been experienced, and he has committed himself to such ‘beliefs’, for instance, as concern the most ancient and least explored parts of the earth, as well as the furthermost reaches of the universe, which have been studied by astronomy. Here is a quotation from his book, Human Knowledge:

“I commit myself to the view that there are valid processes of inference from events to other events .... more particularly, from events of which I am aware without inference to events of which I have no such awareness.” (p. 10)

He takes the same line in his book, My Philosophical Development: “I do think that there are forms of probable inference which must be accepted although they cannot be proved by experience ...” (p. 132)

According to this clear admission on the part of Russell, religion is not something, which cannot be proved by argument: in the above quotation the criterion held valid by him is the same criterion as is used to prove the truth of religion.

What is more surprising is that Russell, although indirectly admitting here that such inferential arguments as he terms scientific do exist in favour of religion, he actually rejects those arguments on quite casual grounds.

Here I quote from his book, Why I am Not a Christian:

I think all the great religions of the world—Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, and Communism—both untrue and harmful. It is evident as a matter of logic that, since they disagree, not more than one of them can be true. With very few exceptions, the religion which a man accepts is that of the community in which he lives, which makes it obvious that the influence of environment is what has led him to accept the religion in question. It is true that Scholastics invented what professed to be logical arguments proving the existence of God, and that these arguments, or others of a similar tenor, have been accepted by many eminent philosophers, but the logic to which these traditional argu-ments appealed is of an antiquated Aristotelian sort which is now rejected by practically all logicians except such as are Catholics. There is one of these arguments, which is not purely logical; I mean the argument from design. This argument, however, was destroyed by Darwin; and, in any case could only be made logically respectable at the cost of abandoning God’s omnipotence.”
(p. 9)

The most important point here is that Russell has considered the argument from design as being valid. But while accepting this in principle, Russell says that Darwinism has altogether destroyed its logical position or, at least, has lessened its importance to a considerable degree.

Let us throw some light on Russell’s statement. What he means to say is that it is the claim of religion that there is design in the universe, which is a proof that there is some consciousness behind it, which has accorded it this ‘design’. Had it not been so, the universe would have been a pile of garbage, and to Russell, this argument is true in principle. But then he says that Darwin has proved from his study of biological species that various species of life which exist on earth in organized and meaningful form have, in fact, evolved over a period of millions of years through a process of material action and interaction. For instance, the giraffe was not created, but evolved from the goat after a long process of natural selection.

I do not want to dwell in detail on Darwinism, suffice it to say that Russell, while admitting the validity of the argument in principle, has rejected the very same argument on very flimsy grounds.

First and foremost, it must be borne in mind that Darwinism is an unproved theory. The only thing that it can be said to indicate is that all forms of life did not appear on earth at one and the same time, but that the different species had their origin at different points in time. Further it shows that there was a particular sequential order, that is, the simpler forms of life appeared first, and the more complex followed later. Yet there is absolutely no proof that the more complex and more meaningful forms of life have actually developed from those simpler forms which supposedly came into existence on their own as a result of material action and interaction. The first point was undoubtedly derived from observation, but the second point is entirely an inference of the evolutionists whose argument is certainly not based on actual observation and cannot therefore be demonstrated. The validity of Russell’s argument, however, rests on the proof of the second aspect of evolution.

This weakness in the theory of evolution is admitted by the very scholars who uphold it. For instance, Sir Arthur Keith says: “Evolution is unproved and unprovable. We believe it only because the only alternative is special creation, and that is unthinkable.”

That is why the issue of evolution has two such distinct aspects to it. One is its theory, and the other is its cause. The theory of evolution is said to be a certainty, whereas the cause of evolution is as yet unknown. How is it possible for a concept to be believed with such certainty when the causes are unknown? It is like saying that the concept of evolution is a theory for which arguments have yet to be discovered, but which has nevertheless been accepted by the evolutionists as an established fact.

That such an ill-founded concept could destroy all arguments in favour of religion is plainly untenable. Even were we to suppose that the different living species came into being through a process of evolution, Russell’s claim still cannot be proved. Belief in Russell’s claim entails belief in the supposition that God could create only at one point in time and that he could not continue to give life over a long period. Not only is there no basis for this hypothesis, but even if it were acceptable, it would in no way refute the omnipotence of God.

There is a time-honoured belief that it was an omnipotent God who created amongst other things, man and the trees. But this has never shaken man’s belief that it takes anything from twelve to eighteen years for a baby to grow to full adult height, followed by a process of maturation which goes on for many more years, or that it can take more than half a century for a tree to grow from a seed to its greatest height. In order to believe in Almighty God, it has never been thought necessary to believe that the man and the tree came into existence all of a sudden.

Even if, in future, research proves that the phenomena of life did not appear abruptly but came into existence by means of a long evolutionary process, there can be no question of a rethinking of, far less a rejection of religion.

A Final Word

The above-quoted statements of Bertrand Russell, an avowed atheist, serve as an acknowledgement of the truth of religion in principle. He admits that there is design in the universe, and that design can prove the existence of a designer. But in order to reject this argument based on design, he had to have recourse to Darwinism, which means rejecting his own accepted position on very flimsy grounds. This is because the existence of design is a unanimously established fact, whereas Darwinism is not an established fact. At least, that part of the theory of evolution which asserts that, by material action and interaction, meaningful design can come into existence among living species is certainly still only a hypothesis. When the design exists, the argument in favour of a designer is, according to Russell, valid. Since Darwinism has yet to be acclaimed as a final truth, a ‘Russell’ can hardly on this basis, reject arguments in favour of religion.